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Morality, Corruption and the State: 
Insights from Jharkhand, Eastern India 
 
 
The fading hopes of achieving development through strong government in many postcolonial 
states have meant an increasing focus on ‘good governance’ by multilateral development 
institutions. While governance in Africa is interpreted as a return to ‘the heart of darkness’ 
(Bayart, 1993), a ‘criminalisation of politics’ (Bayart et al., 1999), India is gripped by a 
pathology of corruption rotting the core of the state (Gill, 1998; Vishvanathan and Sethi, 
1998). A central concern of this governance agenda is an idea of a growing crisis: a cancer of 
corruption whose corrosive spread hinders and obstructs development. Despite the public 
scandals in the West (see Haller and Shore, 2005) – the proliferation of anti-corruption, 
accountability and transparency teams committed to controlling and curing corruption centre 
on the ‘Third World’.  
 
Definitions are widely debated but the World Bank (1992; 2007) promoted one is popular – 
corruption is the misuse of public property, office or mandatory power for private gain. 
Corrupt people hinder the developing economy by using public resources for their personal 
gain. The moral agenda underpinning this argument is that one must work solely for the 
common good: the spread of corruption is an effect of people satisfying personal interests 
rather than the collective good of development. The corrupt actor is a rational economic man, 
usually with dubious moralities, who misuses state resources for private gain.  
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This paper argues for a more sophisticated understanding of corrupt practices by showing 
how they are situated in wider understandings of the state and are underpinned by the inter-
relations between a moral and political economy. It draws on ethnographic fieldwork carried 
out since 1999 in Bero Block, Jharkhand, India and focuses on retail corruption1 linked to the 
Block Development Office, the most local level office of the district administration in India 
and through which programmes of the Ministry of Rural Development were implemented.  
 
Several related points are made. First, defining corruption as underpinned by rational 
economic action tells one little about localised nuances of morality and legitimacy attached to 
these practices. Gupta (2005) is correct that narratives surrounding corruption are central to 
understandings that ordinary people have of the state. However, the reverse is equally true: 
understandings of the state are crucial to narratives and practices of corruption. The rural 
elites of Jharkhand, primarily the descendants of higher caste ex-zamindars (landlords) of the 
area (the main beneficiaries of state development schemes for the poor) understood and, to a 
certain extent, accepted the idea that the state should act for the common good. However, 
state determined rules and norms about developmental projects were in practice not seen as 
beneficial for the common good. They acknowledged that the state could not be separated 
from the personal agency of the people that make it and shape it; that many state development 
schemes were inappropriate; and more problematically, that the intended beneficiaries, the 
poor adivasis of the rural area, were in any case too jangli (wild and savage) to access them.  
 
These rural elites accessed state resources through an informal economy of the state - 
practices that some commentators would consider ‘corrupt’, the abuse of public resources for 
private economic gain. History and anthropology have taught us how economic actions of 
people are defined by a moral economy of rights and expectations, which though may be 
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rooted in economic practices, are not determined by financial utility (Scott, 1979; Thompson, 
1971). In Jharkhand, ‘corrupt practices’ were underpinned by a moral economy and not just 
indulged in for private gain. They were, as Olivier de Sardan (1999) argues, embedded in 
wider social relationships and understandings that gave them legitimacy and anchored them 
in everyday practice. Motivations for engaging in the informal economy of the state included 
social pressure within a nexus of power relations between individuals, the desire to belong to 
a particular group f people and become a particular kind of man, and the importance of the 
relationship between a short and long term cycle of exchange in which morality was 
governed by a cosmic order. Moreover, a localised discourse on rules and norms was 
prevalent.   
 
My second point is that communities at the receiving end of development schemes are not 
homogenous: it is important to address the relationship between different social classes, and 
their related state access, influenced by distinct yet interdependent values. I thus highlight the 
multiple moral economies regulating economic action in rural Jharkhand. The majority in this 
rural region are poorer Munda and Oraon adivasis, tenant descendants of the old village 
landlords. Unlike the rural elites, they saw the state as inherently and irredeemably beyond 
the moral pale, wanted little to do with the state, did not accept the idea of the state as acting 
for the public good, and did not get involved in knowing about state practices. Instead, they 
promoted an alternative vision of sovereignty, in the form of the adivasi parha.  
 
My third point is that the moral economies within which we should understand ‘corrupt’ 
practices are intimately connected to a political economy as seen by Roseberry (1988: 179), 
whereby social and cultural phenomena are situated in the wider circumstances of sustaining 
a living and the structures of power that shape and constrain activity. Adivasi perspectives 
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were not merely based on cultural or moral imaginings but on a political economy of 
historical/colonial experiences of state formation and encouragement by village elites 
colonising the local state and as such interested in blocking those below them in the class 
hierarchy from interacting in the informal economy of state development schemes on equal 
terms. My aim in highlighting the political economy of imaginations of the state is to show 
that adivasis do not have some inherent moral assumptions about the state, but that ideas of 
morality are historically constituted, managed and reproduced. Transformations in political 
economy transforms accompany changes in the moral economy. This is evidenced in rural 
Jharkhand where the power base of the village elites is beginning to be challenged by a new 
class of educated adivasi youth who are increasingly imagining the idea of the state as acting 
for the public good and therefore engaging with the state. 
 
The Context 
 
Jharkhand’s doubly marginalised indigenous populations are a focus for developmental 
efforts. Marginalised because they live in a state housing one of India’s poorest populations 
where, in 1997, 63% of its 26.9 million people were thought to live ‘below the poverty line’, 
with 78% in rural areas, and where only 40% of villages have road access and 15% have 
electricity. Doubly marginalised because many are thought to be so lowly as to be placed 
outside the caste system. These are the people officially designated Scheduled Tribe status, 
more popularly known as adivasis, and in colonial times called tribals. The majority of 
development resources come through the official state machinery via the Block offices.  
 
The paper begins with an account of a 1999 conflict in the Bero Block Development Office 
but also draws on ethnographic research exploring the wider rural area from a base in a 
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village called Tapu. With a population of about 550 people, Tapu represents the historical 
deep divisions of the area. On the one hand, approximately 20% of the population are 
descendants of the old landlords, the rural elites. Although the rural elites include a few 
adivasi descendants of land revenue collecting families, the majority are all higher castes, 
collectively known as sadans. On the other hand, there are descendants of the old tenants, 
adivasis (mainly Mundas and Oraons and constituting 60% of the region’s population), and 
some dalits and other lower castes.  
 
At first glance, the differences between the sadan elites and the adivasis may not be very 
apparent. The sadans also lived in mud houses and had neither electricity nor sanitary 
facilities. They also fetched water from wells or water pumps, collected firewood from the 
forest, farmed their fields and sometimes even partook in manual labour. These similarities 
marked an ‘aesthetics of poverty’, that is the power of the seductive visual imagery of 
poverty, through which it is easier for development schemes to legitimise why these rural 
elites are the main beneficiaries of development resources in the name of the poor - most of 
the rural elites are registered on the government ‘Below Poverty Line’ list and on the ‘Red 
Card’ lists of the Public Distribution System for the poorest, whilst most adivasis are not.  
 
However, a deeper analysis that moves beyond an ‘aesthetics of poverty’ – and that addresses 
poverty not simply in terms of material resources but also as a form of systematic socio-
political exclusion from the development process – may draw attention to some marked 
differences. For instance, the sadans usually had larger plots of irrigated land and more cattle 
than the adivasis. The sadans had family bank accounts. Although literacy rates were low in 
the village, their children attended at least primary school. But perhaps the most important 
difference for this article is that whereas the sadans maintained their livelihoods through 
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direct and/or indirect benefits from the developmental machinery infiltrating the rural areas, 
most often in the form of the state, the adivasis sought to keep outside authorities such as the 
state away.2 
 
The hostile antagonism, mutual disparagement and contrasting values of the sadans and the 
adivasis explored here are partly explained by the socio-economic history of this Jharkhand 
region. One result of the eighteenth century colonial land settlement policies, the higher caste 
landlords of the area displaced lower castes and tribes from other areas and brought them as 
servants to villages they controlled. In return for their servitude, the landlords gave them a 
small amount of land to cultivate. In 1932 while the average size of a landlord landholding in 
Tapu was 33.2 hectares, that of an adivasi was about 8.3 hectares. By 1992, however, the 
land reform changes of the fifties (such as the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act which 
placed a ceiling on land ownership), meant that the disparity had somewhat lessened and all 
the adivasis now owned some land. Moreover, the landlord descendants had an average 
landholding of 2.7 hectares and the adivasis, 1.8 hectares. As a result of these changes, 
coupled with the now broken social contract of adivasi servitude to the landlord descendants, 
the latter sought alternative routes to maintain their local dominance. From land, their 
attention turned to a control over state resources, whether directly (from government jobs) or 
indirectly (through, for instance, development contracts). The sadans had different 
aspirations from the adivasis who they looked down on and often called by the derogatory 
term ‘jangli’. In contrast to those above them in the class hierarchy, the poorer majority were 
in fact often proud to be of the Jungle Raj (the Forest Kingdom) and of the values this 
entailed. They generally sought to keep the state away, lived off arable and livestock 
agriculture, fruits and leaves from the trees and manual labour. These changing material 
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 7 
contexts are important to understand the analyses which follow and the incident which 
prompts them, that of the incomplete building: 
 
 
Incomplete Building 
 
Bero 1998. A cheque of Rs2 lakh (£3100) arrived for the construction of a training centre for 
the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) - one of several schemes 
implement by the Block Development Office (or Block Office).3 Launched in 1982, and 
partially funded by UNICEF till 1996, DWCRA was a Ministry of Rural Development 
response to a male bias in poverty alleviation programmes. In line with the emerging 
popularity of micro-credit/micro-enterprise schemes, DWCRA aimed at improving poor 
women’s economic condition by promoting their collective participation in self-help income 
generating activities.  
 
The Ministry's role in this ‘empowerment' of women was, generally, low resource. The 
Ladies Extension Officer, Kamini Srivastava,4 the only female officer in the Block Office, 
was to introduce DWCRA’s ‘participatory principles’ to poor rural women. She worked 
under the Office head, the Block Development Officer, Makhan Pandey, and, like most 
Jharkhand officers, was of Bihari high caste origin. The Ministry was to train beneficiaries, 
provide a revolving fund of Rs 25000 (£385) for raw materials and, as a one-off payment to 
certain groups, money to build training centres.  
 
In the Bero DWCRA files, largely eaten by white ants, fourteen groups existed and the 
records were unchanged over time. In the State’s capital Ranchi, the District DWCRA 
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supervisor declared the 14 Bero groups successful: four new ones would be formed in 1999. 
Meeting paper targets was essential to receiving the next monetary instalment from the 
Ministry. In fact, Bero Block officers acknowledged that of the 14 groups only two really 
existed – in the villages of Pokal Tikra and Karanj Toli. Pokal Tikra, the model group, was 
chosen as the site for the training centre. 
 
The output produced determined ‘success’ and Pokal Tikra was considered successful 
because they produced hand-woven carpets. However, the officers were careful not to 
mention to visitors that the carpets were woven in a ‘factory’ run as a Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) by a woman named Sumani Devi. Whilst Sumani was a Maheto caste 
descendant of the ex-zamindars of Pokal Tikra, the DWCRA beneficiaries were all adivasi 
women who were descendants of the ex-tenants of the landlords. They walked two kilometres 
from the adivasi dominated hamlet, Sember, to work on Sumani’s handlooms in Pokal 
Tikra’s main hamlet. Unsurprisingly, in the fiasco that evolved over the building, Sumani was 
a central actor. 
 
The construction of any Block Office building attracts attention amongst the officers because 
commissions taken as ‘percentages’, or ‘pcs’ off the money for the scheme. The money 
arrives from the District Office in the name of the Block Development Officer. The 
contractor receives the money in instalments for which a series of documents have to be 
signed by various officers. Percentages are taken while signing these documents. In all 
construction programmes there are two sets of sanctions: in the technical and the 
administrative wings. For example, in the technical wing, the Junior Engineer can take 10%, 
Assistant Engineer 3%, Executive Engineer 1.5%. The administrative wing includes the 
Block Development Officer who can take 5%, the supervisor 3%, the head clerk 3%, the 
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cashier 2% and the assistant clerk 1.5%.5 If the costs can lower, the cuts are higher. 
Altogether, approximately 30% of the scheme money goes to the Block staff.6 These 
‘systems of mediation’ are significant in making the otherwise resource-poor DWCRA a low 
priority for the officers. However, when Pokal Tikra was chosen as a site for the Rs2 lakh 
DWCRA centre, DWCRA became the focus of Block Office attention.  
 
But these construction schemes were also the centre of attention for the rural elites. As part of 
the participatory development mandate, through which villagers chose schemes, public 
petitions for particular schemes were brought in by the rural elites to the Block Office. Only 
some of the proposed schemes would be selected and schemes promoted by influential elites, 
especially those backed by a Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) or a Member of 
Parliament (MP), were preferred.7 Once a project was selected, a village contractor was to be 
chosen through a public meeting. Often, these meetings did not take place, as influential 
elites would fix outcomes. When they did take place, meetings were dominated by rural elites 
competing with each other.  
 
The choosing of a village contractor was a highly fraught affair as potential contractors could 
siphon off up to 10% of the total sum of the project by poorer quality materials and shallower 
foundations than proposed, or by accounting for twice the number of labourers who worked.  
 
In the meeting to choose the Pokal Tikra DWCRA training centre contractor, although 
Sumani’s proposed candidate stood in election, another man was chosen. Furious, Sumani 
accused the head of the Block Office, Pandey, of fixing the results. She claimed that Pandey 
had backed a worker of the Congress Party MLA who, in return, would secure his next 
transfer of post. Sumani also claimed that the chosen contractor would enable the smooth 
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operation of the systems of percentages, and would negotiate a particularly good bribe for 
Pandey for commissioning the project. Moreover, she declared that the chosen contractor 
wanted on his land to colonise as a drinking club for men.  
 
Pandey denied these allegations: the decision had been democratic. He urged Sumani to stop 
interfering in Pokal Tikra affairs: she was a woman and an outsider who had returned to her 
natal village after a failed marriage. Moreover, she was not poor, and should have no role in 
DWCRA whose beneficiaries were supposed to be ‘Below Poverty Line’. Finally, Pandey 
argued that the ‘real’ reason Sumani was angry was because she wanted the building on her 
land to capture as a house extension.  
 
In response, Sumani mobilised Sember residents to strike for fifteen days from the 
agricultural labour that Pokal Tikra ex-zamindars depended on. She caused substantial 
problems and threatened further trouble. When the foundations were dug, Sumani asked 
Sember villagers to fill them with stones. The confrontation worsened. One night, a group of 
armed men, claiming they were underground Maoist guerrillas, beat up the contractor and 
two family members. The rumour spread that Sumani was behind these developments. 
Sumani also took 30 Sember women to the Deputy Development Commissioner and District 
Commissioner in Ranchi to complain against Pandey commissioning the building to an 
inappropriate contractor.  
 
Deterred by these developments, Pandey (in whose hands the ultimate authority of all Block 
decisions remained), wanted to cancel the project all together. His strategy was to feign 
ignorance about the ‘real’ conditions of the ‘model' DWCRA group. He staged an official 
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visit by Srivastava so that the Block Office would ‘discover’ the group’s failure to function 
under the guidelines.  
 
Srivastava’s visit to Pokal Tikra was unannounced. I accompanied her. Srivastava asked for 
the DWCRA group leader as we entered a room with two handlooms worked by Oraon 
women. The women looked scared, did not reply and continued working without taking their 
eyes off the looms. Eventually one of them called for Sumani. Srivastava shouted, ‘Sumani is 
nothing to do with DWCRA.’ Sumani welcomed us with Moti Devi, the alleged leader of the 
carpet-weaving group. The next hour saw an explosion of accusations between Srivastava 
and Sumani. 
 
Srivastava ignored Sumani and asked Moti for the DWCRA files. The files were blank and 
Srivastava criticised the group for not maintaining them. Moti was shaking, nervous and 
nodded at everything Srivastava said. Sumani, however, fought back. She asked how Moti 
was supposed to know about maintaining files when Srivastava had never shown her. She 
attacked Srivastava for acting like all state workers, frightening the women, not caring about 
them, never coming to see them, and not explaining how DWCRA should work. She pointed 
out that DWCRA was not about file maintenance but income generation. The heated 
argument escalated. Srivastava told Sumani that she had no right to interfere. Revealing her 
awareness that the DWCRA group had never really existed, she argued that Sumani was in 
fact exploiting DWCRA women as factory labourers. Sumani argued that at least her 
‘factory’ provided a job for the women and wasn’t just a programme only on paper.  
 
When we finally left Srivastava was fuming. She had, however, accomplished the task of 
‘officially’ uncovering that the DWCRA group was not functioning because of Sumani’s 
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interference. The Pokal Tikra group could be closed and the matter of the building dropped. 
When I returned for further fieldwork in 2000, the building, like many others, remained an 
abandoned incomplete construction.  
 
Corrupt activities are not just explained by financial utility 
 
The negotiations, percentages, bribes and gifts that characterise the informal economy of the 
developmental state in Jharkhand would have stopped, in this case, when the DWCRA 
building was abandoned. Nevertheless its contests give a flavour of the political landscape of 
the informal economy of block development schemes and its analyses might enable a deeper 
understanding of the processes shaping practices termed ‘corrupt’. In what follows, I begin 
with people like Sumani and the competing contractor to show the multiple factors affecting 
their engagement in the informal economy of the state. In much of the literature these 
contractors are called ‘mediators’, ‘intermediaries’, or ‘brokers’, blurring the boundary 
between the state and society (Gupta, 1995; Gupta, 2005; Neocleous, 1996), sometimes 
perpetuating patron-client relations (Bailey, 1969), at other times more positive forces of civil 
society, creating order in the fragmented politics of the post-colonial state (Bierschenk et al., 
2002; Lewis and Mosse, 2006). In Jharkhand, they all emerge from the rural elites, usually 
the descendants of higher caste ex-zamindar, but sometimes Scheduled Tribe ex-revenue 
collecting families. Unlike Sumani, most mediators in the Bero area were men.  
 
In the World Bank perspective these contractors are rational economic individuals 
maximizing personal gain. Since the abolition of zamindari in the 1950s, state benefits were a 
central means through which many zamindar descendants attempted to maintain their wealth. 
Block Office contracts were important as their implementation offered the opportunity to 
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siphon off funds. However, whilst the objective may be obtaining material benefits from the 
state, being a contractor was not solely about financial gain.  
 
Amongst potential contractors, for instance, securing contracts was also about aspiring to 
particular ideas of masculinity – a modern man of the town who hob-nobbed in the streets, 
restaurants and shops of Bero and became part of a peer group of young men acquainted with 
state activities and officials, built personalised relations with those ‘in the know’, and 
developed skills of being in the right place at the right time. Circulating in these elite 
networks in Bero was exciting in comparison to the more mundane village environment. It 
was a challenge to become accepted to wine and dine amongst these networks.8  
 
Becoming accepted was one thing but acquiring status was another. In the village, status 
came with birth, but in Bero young men had to secure their credibility amongst the ‘worldly 
actors’ of predominantly ex-zamindars. Tension and conflict over state resources was rife. 
The men were linked to branches of a political party, whose most prominent personnel 
campaigned for the MLA seat every five years. Particular candidates were supported in the 
hope that victory would influence the distribution of development contracts in favour of 
allies. 
 
Becoming accepted, acquiring status and securing a contract, required skill and tactics to 
perform and ‘do’ ‘politics’. One had to be shrewd, intelligent but also willing to engage in 
‘dirty’ activities (c.f. Goldman, 2001; Ruud, 2001). ‘Dirty’ not just because of the tactful 
alliance building involved, but also because of the secrecy, caution and the potential to stab 
allies in the back if they became a threat. ‘Doing politics’ was dangerous. While many young 
men of zamindar descent tested their ability to do politics, only some sustained involvement 
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for more than a couple of years. ‘Doing politics’ was often a transitory and transient activity 
– a life-cycle experience, after which one settled down to a more ‘peaceful’ existence.  
 
In summary then, the financial utility of pocketing illegal money from Block development 
schemes were not the only attractions for Bero elites to interact in the activities many would 
call corrupt. Far from being rational economic maximising concerns, engaging in ‘corrupt’ 
practices was also about the non-material interests of becoming accepted amongst a particular 
group of people; acquiring status within that group; a life-cycle experience of the challenge 
and fun of doing politics.  
 
The moral economy of ‘corrupt’ practices 
 
The multiple reasons why rural elites engage in ‘corrupt’ practices were accompanied by a 
complex moral economy. A number of points of interest emerge. Firstly, illegality does not 
equate to immorality. Money made from contractor cuts was locally called second order 
work, resulting in second order money (distinct from first number work and money from 
farming or hard manual labour), because it was thought to involve illegal activity. Second 
order work, however, was not condemned by the village elites for its illegality (c.f. Harris, 
1996). In fact a localised moral discourse about the state legitimised second order work.  
 
Thus, secondly: ‘corrupt practices’ were legitimised because there was generally a lack of 
commitment to the state as it manifested itself in rural Jharkhand. Underlying the 
international discourse on corruption is the idea that for progressive economic development, 
people in modern society should submit to the state the ability to define and police the 
principles of morality, or good behaviour, for the collective good through impersonal rules – 
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such as the rule of law. Thus as Robertson reminds us, ‘what in modern times we have been 
calling corruption is a byproduct of the formal rules that seek to separate persons from the 
offices they hold’ (2006:8). There is, as Hart points out, a huge effort involved in separating 
the impersonal state from personal agency. When people step across this division, the word 
often used is ‘corruption’ (Hart, 2005:29), and is one reason why some explain the origins of 
corruption as the extreme personalisation of power relationships (Bayart, 1993). Corruption 
violates the fundamental idea of the state as an impartial servant of the people, as the non-
personal guarantor of a certain impersonal social order. This idea is a crucial one because the 
legitimacy of modern states, to a large extent, rests on this claim (Mooij, 1992). Yet, as 
anthropology has recently shown us, the separation of the impersonal state from personal 
society is highly problematic – there is a complex relationship between personal agency and 
impersonal institutions - personality/personal agency is intrinsic to bureaucracy (Brass, 1997; 
Fuller and Harriss, 2001; Gupta, 1995; Gupta, 2005).  In Jharkhand, the state was thought to 
be incapable of fulfilling the promises of a servant of the people, the guarantor of a certain 
social order, and a power above partial interests because it was recognised to be run by 
people with personal agendas and whose vision of the common good was removed from that 
of ordinary rural people. Moreover, second order work was legitimised because most 
development schemes were thought to be inappropriate for the rural areas as they were 
designed by New Delhi officials. For instance, both Sumani and Srivastava agreed that rather 
than a fancy income generating project, rural women needed a factory for their 
‘development’. Rural elites, in fact were often prejudiced towards the poorest in the rural 
areas. Development schemes were considered wasted on jangli adivasis who were too 
uncivilised to care for or know what to do with them. Like Sumani, many rural elites actually 
legitimised their activities by arguing that they were expropriating state resources for more 
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useful purposes, even calling themselves ‘sevaks’ or ‘social workers’ to outsiders (c.f. Mayer, 
1981). 
 
Thirdly, engaging in ‘corrupt practices’ entailed highly morally charged discussions around 
who got contractorship, why and the way in which the contractor’s cut was spent. While ex-
zamindars saw contractorship as their hereditary right, those wanting to join these elite 
networks took the more democratic approach that all educated young men should have the 
opportunity. As Sumani’s case shows, the moral discourse on contractorship can be gendered. 
When a woman tried to gain contractorship she was condemned for intervening in the world 
of men. Moreover, as the number of potential village contractors rose, there was an 
increasing trend towards rival contractors condemning each other for using do number paisa 
for selfish ends. As a result, competing village elites now pressurised contractors to divert 
their cut to other common village causes, especially as religious donations (c.f. Mosse, 2001). 
In Tapu, a moral discourse around money siphoned off from construction contracts was 
emerging that in many ways appeared to mirror the relationship between short-term and long-
term exchange described by Parry and Bloch (1989). Contractors had to convert, and hence 
purify, their second order money from individualistic short term exchanges of contractor cuts 
into first number sums, in this case of a long term transactional or cosmic order of religious 
capital by contributing to the building of a Hanuman temple.  
 
Fourth extra-legal activities were differentiated and all were not equally condemned. The 
giving and taking of chai-pani (literally meaning tea-water);9 the pagdi (the bribe); and the pc 
or percentage, matching Parry’s (2000) useful distinction between the gift, bribe and 
commission, were all differently morally evaluated. Gift giving was the least reprehensible 
not only because it was part of a broader social system of maintaining relations between 
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people, but also because it was considered willingly engaged in. In contrast, the bribe was 
rarely voluntary on the part of the donor, and thus its giving was sometimes with resentment. 
Furthermore, the bribe’s negotiability engendered feelings of unethical practice, especially if 
one had to give more than others. The commissions, the third form of payment, were a fixed 
percentage of the value of a scheme given by contractors to different officers, expected and 
contracted in a manner that was so ‘matter-of-fact’ that they were rarely considered morally 
wrong. Indeed, it was mainly deviations, not the percentages themselves, which were deemed 
morally wrong.  For example, if an officer tried to take more than his allocated percentage, 
s/he would most likely be regarded as greedy. Yet if an officer did not take their allocated 
percentage s/he may be regarded with respect, not because they acted legally, but because 
those who were not greedy were praised. In a similar vein, if a contractor tried to get away 
without paying the commission, s/he would be considered immoral. This would also hold for 
those who escaped payment due to caste or kinship relations with the officers. Thus morality 
in the discourse of corruption was often judged in the context of values such as caste, 
negotiability, gift giving, hierarchy and greediness.  
 
Fifth, the alleged immorality of ‘corrupt’ activities was sometimes a performance, a tool with 
which village elites played out the competition between them. In fact we need to segregate 
the practices of what is called corruption (but which often amounts to legitimate economic 
activity) from corruption as a discourse used to delegitimise others/political opponents. For 
instance, Sumani claimed that Pandey had backed the chosen contractor because he would 
submit to the system of percentages and bribes. However, she also told me that if her 
candidate had received the contractorship she would also have given the percentages. The 
officials were also engaged in a certain performance of morality around DWCRA. It was 
clear that everyone had known for years that the DWCRA groups were paper targets, and that 
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even in Pokal Tikra, the group were really factory workers. Yet, only when things had not 
gone according to Pandey’s plan, was Srivastava sent to ‘discover’ that Sumani had turned 
the DWCRA women into factory labourers, in order to cease the construction.  
 
Exploring some of the wider context of the DWCRA building shows that people’s 
engagement in practices some would call ‘corrupt’ is not just for financial utility but also for 
a range of non material reasons and moreover, that these practices were governed by ethical 
norms and debates. However, the moral economy of rural Jharkhand is multivarious and a 
different class of rural peasants, represented by the women who worked in Sumani’s factory, 
the adivasi labourers, have a different view of the state. And it is to this moral economy that I 
now turn. 
 
Multiple moral economies: adivasis 
 
The tenant descendants of the zamindars, the majority of who were adivasis, saw the state as 
alien, dangerous and best kept away from. I describe this moral economy in further detail 
elsewhere (Shah, 2007) and here outline the main arguments. Exemplary of the way in which 
those in the margins of stately power are often complicit in reifying the state (Taussig, 
1992:132), adivasis  constructed the state as an abstraction, as inherently and irredeemably 
beyond the moral pale, and not in their common good. In Tapu, the state with its officers and 
development projects took on an almost ominous Kafkaesqe quality for the Mundas, 
encompassed in the term sarkar.  
 
Whenever a state jeep arrived in Tapu, for example, whereas the landlord descendants rushed 
to greet the visitors, the Mundas would steer well away. Somra Munda once said, ‘In the 
Page 18 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 19 
olden days when sarkari (state) people arrived, women would rush into their houses, sweep 
children in and close doors, and men would even hide in the forest.’ This fear of the state has 
also been noticed in the neighbouring state of Chhattisgarh, but also historically amongst 
adivasis of Western India.10  
 
There were several reasons for adivasis’ desire to distance themselves from the state. Firstly, 
their attitudes are embedded in the history of colonial state-formation which proved very 
exclusive and exploitative for poor adivasis. Colonial processes of land settlement and elite 
formation resulted in outside state officers and moneylenders (the outsiders were called 
dikus) working with and producing landed elites, zamindars, alienating adivasis from their 
land, taking over their forests, and rising indebtedness (Guha, 1999 (1983); Singh, 1966). The 
foreign state officers carried on into the post-independence period in the form of Hindu high 
caste Biharis with their exploitative and oppressive policies.  
 
As late as the nineteen eighties, the police were the most significant experience of the state 
for the Tapu Mundas. In the late seventies and in the late eighties, two murder cases resulted 
in the arrest of several Mundas in Tapu who were tortured by the police - their feet were 
whipped and their families were crippled by the incurred legal costs. The other significant 
experience of the state was excise officers, who local people associated with the police, and 
who came to the village to beat those selling rice beer and mahua wine. In Tapu alcohol was 
important for every Munda festival and family ritual occasion and each Munda household 
brewed rice beer and mahua wine for domestic consumption. While this domestic 
consumption was not prohibited in Jharkhand, the sale of alcohol was. Inevitably, everybody 
sold excess created from domestic consumption (and especially at the time of festivals) to 
needy neighbours. Thus, crackdowns on the sale of alcohol by excise officers drove the fear 
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of the state into every single Munda household. This fear was further enhanced when one 
person was jailed for several years. The result, unsurprisingly, was that the state was seen by 
adivasis as part of an ‘outside and foreign’ world: dangerous, unpredictable and best kept 
away from. Indeed, a common term used by adivasis to describe sarkar was ‘soccion’ 
(exploitation). 
 
In recent years the state was seen as becoming increasingly sophisticated in its ability to 
exploit adivasis and this was evident in its most recent camouflage as block officers who 
were seen to disguise their destructive capacity in a language of ‘acting in the interest of the 
poor’ (see Shah, 2007). As such, adivasis rarely showed interest in ration cards which would 
enable access to government subsidised provisions and in being on ‘Below Poverty Line’ 
(BPL) lists for state development schemes. Where adivasis accepted state resources, closer 
investigation demonstrated that it was often under the influence of village elites. In fact, and 
most strikingly, in these circumstances they often believed that the resources came not from 
the state but from the elites themselves. For instance, the women in Sumani’s factory were 
unaware that they were the beneficiaries of a state-run DWCRA programme. Instead, they 
saw themselves as labourers in Sumani’s factory. In other cases, albeit always through the 
encouragement and mediation of the rural elites, adivasis sometimes accessed state resources 
for what they saw as compensation for damage created by the state.  
 
As such many adivasis idealised a former time when, in the absence of sarkar, adivasis 
society had been stronger -  a time of the parha, an adivasi sacral-polity, a sovereign 
structure, which consisted of groups of 12 to 21 villages, ruled by a parha raja at the inter-
village level, and at a village level, by local functionaries called pahans and paenbharras. 
This sacral polity was responsible for resolving all disputes, embodied a non-self-interested, 
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non-divisive and moral politics endorsed by the spirits (Shah 2007), and was fundamentally 
underpinned by the values of egalitarianism, consensus in decision making, reciprocity and 
mutual aid. In contrast to sarkar as a destructive source, the parha was imagined as an 
alternative, authentic, adivasi political vision. In recent years this vision of the parha has 
been revitalised by local Members of Legislative Assembly who, as I argue elsewhere (Shah 
2007), endeavour to win the adivasi vote by promising to keep the state away and instead 
resurrect the parha. The parha was seen as the essence that united and protected adivasis – 
an essence that had, in recent years, been weakened by sarkar. For instance, a common 
example of the weakening of the parha was the rise of the modern courts that were 
expensive, controlled by cheating outsiders who lacked spiritual legitimacy and undermined 
the consensus generating dispute solving function of the parha. Many Mundas attributed the 
waning strength of the parha sacral polity in recent years to the waxing power of sarkar.  
 
Some of the younger generation, to whom I will return, educated and aspiring to join the 
village elites, had more contradictory understandings of sarkar and often looked down on the 
ideas of their relatives and parents, attributing them to ‘illiteracy’. Their kin, however, 
explained the youth’s disenchanted attitudes as further evidence of sarkar’s increasing power 
to mislead the new generations. In fact, many explained that by grabbing those who engaged 
with it, sarkar brought an amoral, self-interested politics into village life, further dividing it. 
Given a choice, adivasis ex-tenant descendents preferred to have nothing to do with the state 
and its officials. Fearful of the state, they preferred to leave contact with the state to the 
zamindar descendants. They rarely acquired the kinds of detailed knowledge of state 
operation that some members of the rural elites accumulated, and furthermore, cared little this 
was the case. There was good reason to see why the state is beyond the moral pale for the 
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adivasis. A historically/and colonially based political economy has marginalised adivasis and 
explains adivasis morality vis-à-vis the state.  
 
Ideas of morality as underpinned by a political economy 
 
Adivasi perceptions of the state were underpinned by the above historical and material 
reasons but also a contemporary political economy in which village elites and local state 
officials acted as mediators reproducing and reinforcing adivasi imaginations of the state.11 
As Nuijten (2003) argues, brokers play a role in the fantasies of state power (c.f. Bailey, 
1969: 169; Collier, 1976). Block officers and local elites needed each other to capture state 
resources and both needed to limit the pool of contractors: village elites wanted to secure 
outcomes and block officers did not want to disappoint contending contractors or their 
political patrons who could hold some leverage over officers and also wanted to enhance the 
conditions for the trust-building necessary to ensure that the bribe-giver would pay. The 
number of contractors are most easily limited if people would not consider becoming 
contractors in the first place.  This was enabled by a reproduction of the discourse that the 
state is so alien and malign that the adivasis would not want anything to do with it. It is in the 
interest of the village elites to performatively reinforce (even exaggerate) the idea that the 
state is totally corrupt – the discourse of corruption is itself an important weapon for the rural 
elites. 
 
Adivasis trying to access land revenue documents, caste certificates, or signatures from 
officers were given an endless run around until it was eventually ‘proven’ to them that they 
needed their village patron to get the job done. Performative dimensions of village elites 
reinforcing adivasi understandings of the state are described elsewhere (Shah, 2007), but let’s 
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take here the example of Wahib, a Muslim tenant descendant in Tapu, whose house was 
destroyed one night by three wild elephants. Neel, a zamindar descendent, convinced Wahib 
that he should acquire state compensation. But the forest officers threw the compensation 
application, written by Neel, in Wahib’s face. Neel’s uncle laughed at Wahib’s attempts, 
asking him if officers could be expected to treat the poor otherwise. He said that only some 
people had leverage over these officers. Neel’s uncle was known to ‘wine and dine’ the 
officers and Wahib thus let him deal with the application, eventually receiving a cheque from 
which the uncle took a cash percentage for some officers and cash for a new suit for himself.  
 
While some of the zamindar descendants would quite willingly joke to me about the stupidity 
of adivasi beliefs about the state, in front of them they would perpetuate the notion of an 
exploitative monolith it was better to stay away from. They realised that the discourse of state 
exploitation was an important narrative to reinforce and even exaggerate. Capturing the local 
economy of the Block Office was more easily enabled by creating a network of personalistic 
ties between state officers and village elites from which others were excluded. This 
‘blocking’ was enabled by taking every opportunity to stress the cultural differences between 
honest, innocent, ignorant, illiterate, insiders (the ex-tenants) and corrupt, exploitative 
outsiders (the state and its agents). Keeping others misinformed about the roles of the state 
was key to controlling state resources. Control of state resources by the officers and village 
elites was based thus on control of both the idea of the state as functioning for the public 
good as well as the localised practices of the state. Part of the reason that adivasis today 
continue to hold the moral view of the state as irredeemably foreign and to be kept away from 
is the result of a localised political economy in which it has been in the interest of other 
villagers to propagate and reinforce such a view.  
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Transforming political economy: transforming moral economy? 
 
These different localised understandings of the state, as well as their reproduction, hold 
important implications for development policy. In recent years, participation and 
decentralisation have been major buzzwords targeted to make development more democratic, 
more likely to reach the poorest and to decrease corruption. However, because these tend to 
treat the localised community and its moral economy as homogenous, there can be little 
assurance that people will really be better served. The community and moral economy is 
differentiated and dominant local interests effect changes over time in their own interest, 
shaping the way in which development programmes are implemented locally (c.f. Corbridge 
and Kumar, 2002). In this context, it is more likely that changes to local class structures, as a 
result of a shift in the localised political economy, will effect changes in adivasi morality vis-
à-vis the state, rather than initiatives that encourage decentralisation and/or participation per 
se.  
 
Indeed, in recent years there is evidence that things are slowly changing as greater numbers 
of adivasis have sought to enjoy middle class lifestyles and village elite status. The seeds of 
these changes were evident in the pre-independence period when Christianisation of adivasis 
increased their access to education and led to the emergence of a small tribal middle class – 
that was in fact responsible for the fight for the separate state of Jharkhand (c.f Corbridge, 
2000; Das, 1992). More recently, even in villages like Tapu that have remained on the 
margins of the state, parents were beginning to send their children to school, in part because 
of increased opportunity to do so created by government reservations for people of Scheduled 
Tribe and Scheduled Caste descent (c.f. Corbridge, 2000). Indeed, whilst in much of the Bero 
area, this expansion of the developmental state has had, as might have been expected, a 
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disproportionately beneficial effect for the rural elites, it has offered some adivasis, 
previously confined to village and kinship based networks, the opportunity to move out into 
the previously ‘foreign’ world of the state and the middle class. In so doing, this emerging 
middle class has begun to view society in new ways and to understand both the idea and the 
practices of the state.12 Whilst the majority of adivasis in Tapu retain the understandings I 
have discussed, an emerging transformation is evident among no more than a handful of 
younger Mundas, and is resonated in the politics of state contractorship in the village.  
 
The first Block Development Office scheme was implemented in the village in 1996 and has 
been followed by one every year thereafter. While there were always tactical battles among 
potential contractors, until 2001 all the elected contractors were sadan men. In the last few 
years, however, these elections have precipitated increasingly fraught conflict between a few 
young educated Munda men on the one hand and the zamindar descendants on the other. The 
young Mundas, unlike their parents, have escaped the essentialised view of the state as 
something to be feared. This is a result of the process of their school and college education, 
which has given them opportunities to understand the state and its agents in different ways.  
 
Ironically, a brief trip to the Bero area between January and March 2007 revealed how it is 
now in the interest of Tapu ex-zamindars to leave the ‘dirty’ politics around state 
development schemes to the new generation of Munda youth. By 2007 many zamindar 
descendants found other means to diversify their livelihoods - Neel had received 
contractorship of the village Public Distribution System shop. Moreover, the Bero area saw 
the expansion of the underground left wing Marxist-Leninist-Maoist inspired guerrilla 
movement, commonly called the Naxalites, who are expanding, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Shah, 2006), through offering better protection to village elites involved in the informal 
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economy of state resources, thus blurring the boundary between the ‘terrorist’ and the state. 
In the context of the increase of fear, suspicion and a more violent atmosphere accompanying 
the greater influence of the Naxalites, some village elites who want to avoid the Naxalites, 
are now feeling that perhaps it might be better to leave state development contractorships to 
the new generation of Munda youth.  
 
But as an emergent adivasi class enters the spheres of the state, many more are left feeling 
that this is further evidence of the state’s malign strength. Parents, for example, who used to 
strongly disapprove of their son’s involvement in state activities now see the dangers of the 
state in many more forms – including the Naxalites. They, like many adivasis more generally, 
retain the belief that the state corrupts individuals and weakens adivasi society.  And one 
result is that their belief in the alternative sovereign structure, the parha, strengthens. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In the last two decades, we have seen the rise of what has been termed a ‘culturalist critique’ 
(Fuller and Harris, 2001) of the Indian State which argues that the notion of the postcolonial 
state in India is an alien ideology that some of its citizens will necessarily culturally 
misunderstand. An influential line of thought sees the ‘failure’ of the postcolonial state as 
India’s ‘natural’ rejection of imposed social change and, furthermore, as evidence of a 
broader pattern inherent in India’s experiments with modernism. The most extreme 
proponents of this argument are Nandy (1998) and Madan (1997) who believe that a 
Westernised elite imposed alien secular Western institutions over ordinary people who 
considered religion as the determining principles by which social conduct should be 
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governed. Variants of this argument, albeit less historically and culturally reductionist, are 
implied in the work of Kaviraj (1984; 1991; 1997), but also Chatterjee (2004), who following 
Gramsci argue that the form of the western liberal postcolonial state exported for India by its 
modernising bourgeoisie was unintelligible for its subaltern populations at the time of 
Independence. Social transformation was not driven from within society but was a function of 
domination attempted through a state-bureaucratic agency and a ‘passive revolution’ that 
substituted planning for political reform (Kaviraj 1984: 225-227; 1991: 80). 
 
In this vein of argument, Chatterjee (2004) has pointed out that many popular terms used to 
describe everyday localised practices of governance, such as ‘civil society’, are really 
categories of a bourgeois political order which are extremely limited in much of the non-
Western world. In India, it does not make sense to insist on localised practices to respect the 
rule of law, equality of law, protection of private property, freedom of contract, because most 
people are not bourgeois and just do not negotiate claims to the modern state in this way. He 
suggests instead, a term, ‘political society’, to describe the way in which localised subjects 
operate on a set of norms which are often quite contrary to what the larger principles of 
governance would dictate.  
 
This article has shown the shades and textures of this political society in relation to the 
debates around corruption, morality and the state, from the localised perspective of the actors 
concerned. Understanding this ‘political society’ is important because we are faced with an 
increasingly powerful international development discourse condemning corruption in the 
developing world. The need to understand people’s moral reasoning about actions which 
some would consider corrupt in their own terms is pressing if we are to get away from the 
idea of corruption as some how pathological. In the Jharkhand case, a number of interrelated 
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points emerge: First, monetary aspects of ‘corrupt’ activities may be eclipsed by a whole 
range of other motivations, governed by a set of moralities, for engaging in those activities. 
As noted long ago by Thompson (1971) and Scott (1979), economic action is governed by a 
pattern of moral rights or expectations. Second, moral reasoning about corruption might itself 
be a tool through which potential opponents are fought off. Third, the institutional dualism at 
the heart of moralistic good governance discourses on corruption, forcing people to separate 
personal agency fr m the state, might well be less honest than an open acknowledgement of 
their interdependence (c.f. Hart, 2005). While it might be accepted that the idea of the state 
should be impersonal in order to serve the greater common good, it is also accepted that the 
state after all consists of real people doing things to and with each other and who are often 
designing policies and development schemes without having any idea about their relevance 
for the people they should allegedly serve. Fourth, the moral set up of everyday life does not 
necessarily agree with official or dominant rules and moralities. Fifth, what is legal is not 
necessarily that which is the most legitimate. Often, the violations of state norms may be 
determined by their perceived inadequacy to live up to the idea of the state as a public body 
working on behalf of the common good. 
 
While understanding ‘political society’ is important, the Jharkhand case crucially warns 
against a promotion of culturalist arguments about corruption – for example, different 
cultures perceive economic practices in different ways. Instead, we need to understand the 
complex interrelationships between how people reason about their ‘corrupt’ practices in the 
wider socio-economic context of understandings of the state, and the multivarious moral and 
political economy determining social action. ‘Political society’ in rural Jharkhand is 
differentiated and has neither a uniform nor a hegemonic moral economy. A fine-grained 
analysis unravels different moral economies and a majority of the rural poor, primarily 
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adivasis, who want nothing to do with the state, do not accept the idea of the state as acting 
for the public good, and do not get involved in knowing about the practices of the state, and 
resurrect an alternative sovereignty, a parha sacral-polity. These are not merely cultural 
imaginings of the state but result from a political economy of historical experience of the 
state as well as ideas encouraged by the village elites in whose interests it is to promote the 
idea of the state as alien, dangerous and so beyond the moral pale that adivasis ought not to 
engage with it. Perpetuating such views of the state, the rural elites are better able to block 
the rural poor from interacting in the public sphere and the moral economy of state 
development schemes on the same terms as they interact. Ideas of morality in this instance 
are also historically constituted, managed and reproduced.  
 
The Jharkhand analysis leaves open two possible future trajectories for adivasi-state relations 
which may of course run parallel to each other. The first is a continued rejection of the state 
and a sustained adivasi movement to resurrect the sacral polity of the parha. The second is a 
transforming political economy: as is evidenced in rural Jharkhand with the emergence of a 
new class of adivasi youth aspiring to join the rural elites, which in turn impacts a 
transforming moral economy. 
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1
 The focus here is on ‘bottom-rung’, ‘petty’ or ‘retail’ corruption though this should not prevent from 
considering the arguments here in the context of more major corruption. 
2
 Jharkhand is known for one of the oldest autonomy movements in India with the first demands for a separate 
State within India made in 1928. The struggle for autonomy initially revolved around the idea that the culturally 
autonomous indigenous people, or adivasis, were exploited and oppressed by the high caste Hindu governments 
that had ruled them from Bihar and was initially the product of Christian converted adivasis (Devalle, 1992; 
Singh, 1966). By 1999, one of the peaks of the Jharkhand movement, it had a wider support from educated non-
Christian adivasis (mainly urban based). In the Tapu area, however, as I have argued elsewhere (Shah 
forthcoming), when I arrived to live there in 2000, only weeks after the state had been formed, most adivasis not 
only did not know of these significant political changes, but also did not care. 
3
 In Jharkhand panchayati elections have not been held since 1978 meaning that the Block Office is responsible 
for the design and implementation of development plans at the village level.  
4
 All names of people and villages are pseudonyms. 
5
 The percentages are fixed slightly differently for different schemes.  
6
 Corbridge et al estimate that fund leakage from Employment Assurance Schemes in Bihar is between 30-35 % 
of the total flow of funds (Corbridge et al., 2005:166). 
7
 I do not have exact information on the way this dependence works in the Bero Block Office, but Robert 
Wade’s (1982; 1985) model of the corruption-transfer mechanism in Andhra Pradesh provides relevant pointers.  
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8
 In some of the literature such young men are described as ‘unemployed’ or ‘berozgar’ (c.f. Heuze, 1996; 
Jeffrey et al., 2002). In Bero, while these men may sometimes classify themselves to outsiders as berozgar, they 
also see networking as a form of employment. 
9
 The transaction is always depicted as one of things but it is often money that transfers hands.  
10
 Parry, personal communication. See also Hardiman (1987: 76) and Mosse (2005: 51). 
11
 As in Brass’s description of police action in Uttar Pradesh, that it is not only a simple case ‘of the agents of 
the state misusing their powers against innocent persons, but a social system in which all are engaged in such 
actions,’ (Brass, 1997:274). 
12
 In fact, in many other areas of India, the activities of the modern development state have enabled power 
structures of the village to change (c.f. Gupta, 1998; Wadley, 1994).  
Page 33 of 33
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds
Journal of Development Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
